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The Notion of Power in the Theories of Bourdieu, Foucault and Baudrillard
(Galios sąvoka Bourdieu, Foucault ir Baudrillardo teorijose)

Santrauka

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama galios sąvoka ir jos pateikimas trijų iškilių prancūzų mokslininkų teorijose, kurias vienija gilus kritinis požiūris į tradicinę galios sampratą atskleidžiant mažiau pastebimus (netiesioginius ir simbolinius) galios aspektus. Nepaisant nemenkų skirtumų tarp šių teorijų, jas galima priskirti atskirai teorijų grupei, siekiančiai atskleisti "realią" galios prigimtį, kurios neįstengia ištirti politinė ar ekonominė analizė. Postūmį tokioms pastangoms suteikia, pasak Foucault, naujosios galios panaudojimo technologijos, pavyzdžiui, tokie metodai kaip mokyklos disciplina, kuri vaikus paverčia labai sudėtingų įtakos ir manipuliacijos sistemų objektu. Todėl naujosios šiuolaikinės visuomenės sąlygos reikalauja naujų socialinės teorijos refleksijų.

Lyginant su tradicinėmis teorijomis Bourdieu, Foucault ir Baudrillardo teorijų galios mikroanalizės įžvalgos yra žymiai pranašesnės. Nors šiose teorijose viena iš pamatinių prielaidų yra ta, kad galia yra išsklaidyta visuomenėje, o ne sutelkta tik vienoje iš jos dalių, galios suvokimas yra ganėtinai skirtingas. Jei Bourdieu teigia, kad galią galima turėti ir analizuoja jos išteklius, tai Foucault yra įsitikinęs, kad galia nėra individų ar grupių nuosavybė ir tiria galios funkcionavimo veiksnius. Tuo tarpu Baudrillard tvirtina, kad galia yra taip išsklaidyta, kad nebėra prasmės kalbėti apie jos šaltinius ir raišką, deklaruodamas "tikrosios" galios mirtį. Kitas bendrasis šių teorijų bruožas yra tas, kad pabrėžiami specifiniai galios ir žinojimo ryšiai. Bourdieu teigimu, žinojimas yra simbolinis tam tikros pasaulio vizijos diegimas; pasak Foucault, žinojimas yra galia apibūdinti kitus ir kurti diskursus, tuo tarpu Baudrillardo nuomone, žinojimas yra tiesiog vaizdinių reprodukcija ir simuliacijos priežastis.

Taigi visi trys autoriai nagrinėja galią santykių perspektyvoje ir aiškina galios santykį su tam tikromis strategijomis. Nors šias teorijas galėtumėme santykiškai išdėstyti post-modernėjimo kryptimi pradedant Bourdieu analize, artimiausia tradicinei galios sampratai, iki Baudrillardo ironiško požiūrio į galios simuliaciją, visgi visos jos turi savitą įvairių galios išraiškų aiškinimo būdą. Tokia požiūrių įvairovė ypač svarbi mūsų laikų nesinchroniškos (Ernsto Blocho vartojamos sąvokos požiūriu) socialinės aplinkos sąlygomis, nes mes gyvename iš karto keliuose pasauliuose ir susiduriame su skirtingomis galios apraiškomis.

Introduction

> *The issues of power and knowledge have occupied a central position within sociological analysis. From work of Weber the exercise of power and domination has been conceptualised within sociology as a constitutive feature of social life…*
>
> *Barry Smart*

The concept of "power" seems to be one of the basic and most attractive but also one of the most difficult to define in contemporary sociology. In this essay it will be concentrated on quite distinct from traditional perspective notion of power, presented by the theories of Bourdieu's, Foucault's and Baudrillard's, what will give possibility also to follow the emergence of post-modern discourse on power.

There are a number of distinctive (or even

contradictory) perspectives of power, mostly rooted in the Weber's and/or Marx's theories. Weber understands by "power" the chance of the man or number of men to realise their own will in a communal action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action (Weber 1978; 181). Besides, he also separate notion of power and authority: when the exercise of power was regarded by people as legitimate, it became authority (institutionalised power, as it Parsons called). While Weber emphasises the importance of force and defines the state as an institution which have a monopoly of force, Marxist sociology sees power concentrated in the ruling class, besides power for them is rooted in economics and involves class struggle (Abercrombie, Hill, Turner 1994; 329). Such general approaches inspired increase of interest in power: a flowering of critics and new attempts to define power in works of Parsons, Mills, Dahl, Paulantzas, *etc*. However, among these new theories it is possible to indicate one more radical critique, which puts accent on the more or less invisible (indirect and symbolic) character of power, and thus unites such different theories as Bourdieu's, Foucault's and Baudrillard's.

The main incitement for this approach was the need to look at power from perspective different than the juridical-political theory of sovereign power and an analysis of the state and to consider the material techniques of power that are not compatible with relations of sovereignty (Smart 1985; 80). Thus here the main question emerges: how does a social system in which a substantial section of the population is obviously disadvantaged and exploited survive without its rulers having to depend on physical coercion for the maintenance of order? (Jenkins 1992; 119). From this perspective, the main task for new theories is to investigate the 'real' nature of power, which remained outside the field of political and economical analysis. As Foucault points out, "the state is superstructural in relation to a whole series of power networks that invest the body, sexuality, the family, kinship, knowledge, technology, and so

forth" (Foucault 1986; 64). Thus the state (or class, group) is not able to cover the whole field of actual power relations that are dispersed through social body. Besides, alongside with fundamental technical inventions, new forms of government and especially increased role of education and knowledge, new technology of exercise of power also emerged. As Foucault argues, it is evident in increased "significance of methods like school discipline, which succeeded in making children's bodies the object of highly complex systems of manipulation and conditioning" (Foucault 1986; 67). Thus these new circumstances require new reflections in social theories, what Bourdieu's, Foucault's and Baudrillard's works are trying to do, although in a very different way as will be shown in this essay.

Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power

It is reasonable to start from the Bourdieu's notion of power, because this French sociologist is less digress from traditional theories focus on the questions "Who has power and how they get it and use it?". However, in constructing a theory of symbolic power, Bourdieu "attempts to specify in theoretical terms the processes whereby, in all societies, order and social restraint are produced by indirect, cultural mechanisms rather than by direct, coercive social control" (Jenkins 1992; 104). As Bourdieu argued, while in previous ages people refused to recognise it even where it was staring them in the face, without turning power into a "circle whose centre is everywhere and nowhere", we have to be able to discover it in places where it is least visible, where it is most completely misrecognized (Bourdieu 1994; 163).

According to Bourdieu's definition, "symbolic power is a power of constructing reality", it is "invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it" (Bourdieu 1994; 164). Symbolic power is a subordinate power: it is a transformed, i.e. not recogniz-

able, transfigured and legitimated form of other forms of power, similarly as transmutation of the different kinds of capital (economic, cultural or social) into symbolic one. Besides, Bourdieu describes these kinds of capital as resources of power. Thus power is something that can be possessed and as such, symbolic power can be accumulated or lost: "agents possess power in proportion to their symbolic capital, i.e. in proportion to the recognition they receive from group" (ibid.; 164).

In this perspective, power is still the instrument "to imply a certain claim to symbolic authority as the socially recognised power to impose a certain vision of the social world, i.e. of the divisions of the social world" (Bourdieu 1994; 106). Here Bourdieu emphasises the role of knowledge and particularly scientific theories by arguing that "social science must include in its theory of the social world a theory of the theory effect which, by helping to impose a more or less authorised way of seeing the social world, helps to construct the reality of that world" (ibid.; 106). This way (or certain vision) of seeing the social system Bourdieu calls as 'symbolic systems', systems of mental structures, systems of classification or principles of hierarchization.

These 'symbolic systems' fulfil their political function, as instruments that "help to ensure that one class dominates another (symbolic violence) by bringing their own distinctive power to bear on the relations of power which underlie them" (Bourdieu 1994; 167). Thus Bourdieu employs in his theory of symbolic power the perspective of conflicts and class interests in terms that "the different classes and class fractions are engaged in a symbolic struggle properly speaking, one aimed at imposing the definition of the social world that is best suited to their interests" (ibid.; 167). According to Bourdieu, these classes can engage in this struggle either directly, in the symbolic conflicts of everyday life, or else by the struggle between the different specialists in symbolic production. This process goes in a way by which "the dominated fraction (clerics or 'intellectuals' and 'artists', depending on the

period) always tends to set the specific capital, to which it owes its position, at the top of the hierarchy of principles of hierarchization" (ibid.; 168).

One of the main features of this symbolic struggle is that "the ideological stances adopted by the dominant are strategies of reproduction which tend to reinforce both within and outside the class the belief in the legitimacy of the dominant of that class" (Bourdieu 1994; 167). The field of ideological stances thus reproduces in transfigured form the field of social positions and also the established order that is "largely secured by symbolic violence [the violence which is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity], a process of cultural reproduction" (Jenkins 1992; 147). According to Bourdieu, ideologies are always "*doubly determined*, that they owe their most specific characteristics not only to the interests of the classes or class fractions they express, but also to the specific interests of those who produce them and to the specific logic of the field of production" (Bourdieu 1994; 169). This provides us with a means of avoiding the Marxist reduction of ideological products to the interests of the classes which they serve.

If to return to the mechanisms of symbolic power, dominant discourse (ideology) in the society is "a structured and structuring medium tending to impose an apprehension of the established order as natural" (Bourdieu 1994; 169). This is achieved through a process of misrecognition, by which Bourdieu means "the fact of recognition a violence which is wielded precisely inasmuch as one does not perceive it as such" and it "certainly does not fall under the category of influence" (ibid.; 169). For him, there is much more powerful and insidious reason than that: "being born in a social world, we accept a whole range of postulates, axioms, which go without saying and require no inculcating" (Bourdieu, Wacquant 1992; 168). What Bourdieu puts under the term of "recognition", then, "is the set of fundamental, pre-reflexive assumptions that social agents engage by the mere fact of taking the world for granted, of accepting the world as it is, and of finding it

natural because "their mind is constructed according to cognitive structures that are issued out of the very structures of the world" (ibid., 168). The destruction of this power of symbolic imposition based on misrecognition depends on *becoming aware* of its arbitrary nature, i.e. the disclosure of the objective truth and the destruction of belief (Bourdieu 1994; 170).

To sum up, Bourdieu concentrates on the diffused symbolic power, which presents in all the social relations, can be possessed and used as instrument of domination by individuals or groups. However, his analysis of symbolic power, as argued Jenkins, remains weak, for example, at the institutional level. Institutional approach is neglected by Bourdieu: how institutions are run and controlled, bureaucracy as specifically modern social form, formality and informality, inter- and intra-organisational politics, etc. What he seems to mean when he talks about institutions, or, rather, how he constitutes them sociologically, is as a category of data about the individuals who work in them, or are otherwise 'members'. But "power and domination are among the most important concerns and characteristics of organisations and institutions" (Jenkins 1992; 123). For such critics can be answered, that Bourdieu specially escaped this institutional level (as it is maintained by Jenkins) because of other aim to investigate the invisible aspects of power. Besides, as Lash noticed, Bourdieu in indirect way reveals the relationship between symbolic power and institutions: in modern societies direct symbolic violence between subjects declines, instead, fields or structures produce symbolic goods and hence exercise symbolic power. It shows that pre-modern power takes place via a set of unmediated exchanges between subjects, while modern power stems from a relationship between fields (whose symbolic economy imparts to them their structure) and 'consumer' who is subject to this power (Lash 1992; 256). Much more essential critics Bourdieu theory of symbolic power received from the side of Foucault.

Foucault's theory of disciplinary power

In contrast to Bourdieu, Foucault focuses not on the questions "Who has power and how they get it and use it?", but rather on "How does power function in society?". Thus analysis of power in this perspective addresses not centralised and legitimate forms of power but techniques that have become embodied in local, regional, material institutions (Smart 1985; 78). For Foucault, power has strictly relational character. It rises from Foucault's view, that power cannot be considered a possession or capacity of groups or individuals (Foucault 1979; 98). Power is not simply a commodity that may be acquired or seized. Rather, it runs through the whole social body, functions in the form of a chain, and is exercised through a productive networks which are extended everywhere and in which all are caught (Foucault 1986; 61). From this viewpoint individuals are not agents of power, as Smart pointed out, they neither possess power nor have their potential crushed or alienated by it; to the contrary, "one of the prime effects of power [is] that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain desires come to be identified and constituted as individuals (Smart 1985; 78).

According to Sarup, "Foucault states that the mechanisms, techniques and procedures of power were not invented by the bourgeoisie, were not the creation of class seeking to exercise effective forms of domination" (Sarup 1988; 74). Thus, instead of concentrating attention on the motivation or interests of groups, classes or individuals in the exercise of domination analysis, Foucault invites to direct the analysis on mechanics of power, what were never analysed (Foucault 1986; 58). In the same way, Foucault rejects of his analysis also traditional notions of ideology and repression as negative, narrow and thus unusable. For him, the notion of ideology always stands in virtual opposition to something else which supposed to count as truth, besides it refers to something of the order of subject, and third, ideology stands in secondary position to something which functions as its infrastructure, as it ma-

terial, economic determinant (ibid.; 60). Also in defining the effects of power as repression, according to Foucault, one adopts a purely juridical conception of such power; one identifies power with a law that says no; power is taken above all as carrying the force of a prohibition (ibid.; 60). In this perspective, Foucault "replaces a juridical, negative conception of power with a technical and strategic one. Modern power operates through the construction of 'new' capacities and modes of activity rather than through the limitation of pre-existing ones" (Sarup 1988; 73).

Similarly to the methodology of Bourdieu theory, Foucault also argues that "analysis should proceed from micro-level [not from macro-institutional, e.g. the power of the state] in order to reveal the particular histories, techniques and tactics of power. Such an ascending analysis of power would in addition be able to reveal how mechanisms of power have been appropriated, transformed, colonised and extended by more general or global forms of domination [how particular mechanisms of power became economically advantageous and politically useful] (Smart 1985; 78). Of course, the critics of Foucault argue against this position because in their opinion he "neglects the state and focuses only on the micro-powers that are exercised at the level of daily life" (Sarup 1988; 79).

Foucault theory puts the main accent on the relationship between power and knowledge. In fact, Foucault started from structuralism where all relations were seen as linguistic, symbolic, discursive. Later he found such linguistic model to be limited and became increasingly interested in power. For Foucault, "it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power" (Sarup 1988; 74). He emphasised the interdependence of power and knowledge: "there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault 1979; 27).

Similarly to Bourdieu, Foucault argues that "knowledge is a power over others, the power to define others" (Sarup 1988; 67). It is possible because power "produces reality"; it "produces domains of objects and rituals of truth" (Foucault 1979; 194). As Foucault argues, "truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves" (Foucault 1986; 72). In fact, truth induces regular effects of power: "each society has its regime of truth, its "general politics" of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in acquisition of truth; the status of those are charged with saying what counts as true" (ibid.; 73). For Foucault, as Sarup noticed, nothing in society will be changed if the mechanisms of power [thus regime of true] that function outside, below and alongside the state apparatuses on a much more minute and every level are not also changed (Sarup 1988; 79).

The regime of truth in modern society, according to Foucault, induces disciplinary power. This new type of power, disciplinary power, has been described as a 'fundamental instrument in the constitution of industrial capitalism and of the type of society that is its accompaniment' and its development and exercise as inextricably associated with the emergence of particular apparatuses of knowledge and the formation of the human sciences" (Smart 1985; 80). Foucault emphasised the role of human sciences because it "have made man a subject of study and a subject of the state. There has been an unrelenting expansion of rationalised systems of administration and social control" (Sarup 1988; 72).

For Foucault, discipline is "a specific technique of power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its exercise", moreover, "it functions as a calculated, but permanent economy" (Foucault 1979; 170). Discipline provides procedures for 'correct'

training or for coercing bodies (individual or collective). The means through which disciplinary power achieves its hold are hierarchical observation [surveillance], normalising judgement, and examination. Hierarchical observation secretly prepares a new knowledge in the 'observatories' (i.e. military camps, hospitals, prisons, schools, etc.) of human multiplicities: "it provided the basis on which a new configuration of power developed, one that organized and arranged space to facilitate observation of those within, and by rendering people visible it in turn made it possible to know them and to alter them" (Smart 1985; 86). Normalising judgement is related with specific form of punishment because it in a regime of disciplinary power is not expiation or direct repression by, rather, normalisation in terms of reducing gaps between people. Thus, in effect what is being punished is "non-conformity which the exercise of disciplinary power seeks to correct" (ibid.; 86). But, as Foucault pointed out, "punishment is only one element of a double system: gratification-punishment" (Foucault 1979; 180). In this perspective can be argue, that such mechanism (or technique) of power are more exhaustive than Bourdieu's 'symbolic violence'. The examination combines both previous mechanisms of power: it is a normalising gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. Here are combined the ceremony (rituals) of power and the form of examination, the deployment of force and the establishing of truth (ibid.; 184).

All these mechanisms of discipline from one side impose homogeneity (in terms of the normality), but from other side, they also play part in classification, hierarchization and the distribution of rank by making possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, etc. (ibid.; 184). However, in general the accent in description of these mechanisms seems to be not on the process of individualisation, but, rather, on the specific technology of power [discipline] which, as Foucault puts, fabricates individuals. For such perspective the theory of Foucault is criticised, i.e. by Dreyfus and Rabinow: "Discipline and Punish tells a story of the objectification of human beings through the use of power-knowledge, and its critique of power and society is largely an extension of this imagery of dehumanizing domination" (Garland 1994; 170).

Other critique of Foucault theory concerns (similarly as critique of Bourdieu) the lack of institutional level, besides, as Garland argue: "Foucault's works refuses to make discerning judgements about the different purposes to which 'power' can be put, and in so doing, implies that one is no better than any other" (Garland 1994; 170). There are only some points of critique (and perhaps critique of 'post-modern' features of this theory), other kind (and directed towards undeveloped 'post-modern' features) of critique is provided by Baudrillard.

III. Baudrillard on "the end of social" (post-modern perspective of power)

While Foucault and also Bourdieu argue that individuals are constituted by power relations, power being the ultimate principle of social reality, Baudrillard insists that in post-modern society phenomena which they describe (and helped constitute) have radically changed. For him "power is so dispersed, pulverised, and dematerialised that it is seemingly impossible to chart its trajectories, structures, relations and effects" (Kellner 1989; 134). While Foucault also dispersed power through a multiplicity of sites, discourses, practices and strategies, according to Baudrillard, he failed to analyse simulations of power.

In his early works, Boudrillard generally cited Foucault positively, and often borrowed terminology, examples and strategies from him (i.e. Baudrillard's genealogy of the order of simulacra[1] followed the model of Foucault's *epistemes*, or structures of knowledge). However, later he began to question more aggressively some of the basic concepts of radical social theory - power, desire, revolution and social itself (Kellner 1989; 131). But the influence of Foucault theory is still significant in terms of choice of important themes, especially that consists power.

Like Foucault, power for Baudrillard no longer resides securely anchored in spheres like the economy or in institutions like state, prisons and so on, but is radically dispersed throughout society. According to Baudrillard, post-modern semiurgy proliferates signs of power, and power comes to reside in codes, simulations, media and the like. Moreover, "in contemporary post-modern society the proliferation of signs of power and simulation models have so radically decentred power that it has now mutated into signs of dead power" (Kellner 1989; 134). Thus, Baudrillard grounds his theory of power on this more general assumptions about era of simulation - the end of social and power also.

Baudrillard argues that in post-modern era, in era of the media and consumer society, people have less and less relationships to external 'reality': they are caught up in the play of images. In fact it is "world of simulacra where the image or signifier of an event has replaced direct experience and knowledge of its referent or signified" (Sarup 1993; 164). Thus, it is world of total simulations, where simulations are "different from a fiction or lie in that it not only presents an absence as a presence, the imaginary as a real, it also undermines any contrast to the real, absorbing the real within itself" (Baudrillard 1996; 6).

According to Baudrillard, the challenge of simulation is irreceivable by power. How can you punish the simulation of virtue? The established order can do nothing against it, for the law is a second-order simulacrum [modernity] whereas simulation is a third-order simulacrum [post-modernity], beyond true and false, beyond equivalencies, beyond the rational distinctions upon which function all power and entire social stratum. Further, in the world where nothing is real power itself eventually breaking apart in this space and becoming a simulation of power, disconnected from its aims and objectives, and dedicated to power effects and mass simulation. By this logic, as is the fact that power is no longer present except to conceal that there is none (Baudrillard 1996; 179).

For Baudrillard, 'true' power is, or was (if to take into account what it was in modern society), a structure, a strategy, a relation of force, a stake (Baudrillard 1996; 181). As it can be noticed, it is more related with law, coercion, thus it has no productive dimension as Foucault's notion of power. Baudrillard suggests that it is like the DNA code which "dominates and controls flows and intensities of behaviour, and that therefore to fetishize a molecular politics or a micropolitics of desire might be to advocate a politics of liberation in a sphere which itself may be controlled by coercive, and in some cases unknown, powers" (Kellner 1989; 139). Unlike Foucault, he maintains that power can be accumulated and preserved, thus in this argument Baudrillard is closer to Bourdieu views. Besides, he claims that "power by its nature is reversible, that the dominated can always become the ones who dominate, that the terms of power are always subject to radical reversal, and that power relations are thus always becoming undone, reversing and redefining themselves" (Kellner 1989; 134). However, in the era of simulations, power (as was showed above) comes down to nothing more than the critical obsession with its survival that becomes greater the more it disappears. It can results in "melancholy for societies without power: this has already given rise to fascism, that overdose of power referential in a society which cannot terminate its mourning" (Baudrillard 1996; 180). Besides, according to Baudrillard, it is not possible to speak about ideology of power: "it is no longer a question of the ideology of power, but of the scenario of power. Ideology only corresponds to a betrayal of reality by signs; simulation corresponds to a short-circuit of reality and to its reduplication by signs. It is always the aim of ideological analysis to restore the objective process; it is always a false problem to want to restore the truth beneath simulacrum" (ibid.; 182).

In post-modern consumer society power is nothing but the object of a social demand, and hence subject to the law of supply and demand, rather than to violence and death. Completely expunged from the political dimension, it is

dependent, like any other commodity, on production and mass consumption (ibid., 181). Power, too, for some time now produces nothing but signs of its resemblance. And at the same time, another figure of power comes into play: that of a collective demand for signs of power - a holy union which forms around the disappearance of power (ibid.; 180).

According to Baudrillard, the best example of power functioning in such society is the media. He argues that in case of the media it is possible sustain two opposing hypotheses: they are the strategy of power, which finds in them the means of mystifying the masses and of imposing its own truth. Or else they are the strategic territory of the ruse of the masses, which exercise in them their concrete power of the refusal of truth, of the denial of reality. Now the media are nothing else than a marvellous instrument for destabilising the real and the true, all historical or political truth (there is thus no possible political strategy of the media: it is a contradiction of terms) (Baudrillard 1996; 217). Therefore the media "manipulate in every sense at once. No one can control this process: the media are the vehicle for the simulation which belongs to the system and for the simulation which destroys the system…" (ibid.; 218).

According to Kellner, a comparison of Foucault's theories with those of Baudrillard would allow us to show "what is wrong with Baudrillard's way of seeing and theoretical perspectives" (Kellner 1989; 141). First, for "those condemned to work or condemned to live in prisons, hospitals and mental institutions, [power] is all too real"; secondly, power functions in a multitude of ways in everyday life that should not be ignored. Dominant forms of power often focus on and attempt to shape and channel desire in such a way that desire and power become interrelated, especially in the consumer society and in the mass politics of the twentieth century" (ibid.; 141). However, works of Baudrillard reveal some other significant features of power as simulation of power in post-modern society that in accordance with other novelties, as Poster pointed out, "represents the beginning of a line of

thought, one that is open to development and refinement by others" (Baudrillard 1996; 8).

Conclusions

To sum up, the theories of Bourdieu's, Foucault's, and Baudrillard's, despite all differences between them, present one perspective of power. All of them agree that in purpose to investigate the nature of power it is necessary to deconstruct this phenomenon. All of these theories derive far from traditional ones by the focusing on the microanalysis of power and reducing the institutional level. Moreover, they emphasised the relation of power and knowledge in a broad terms that includes Bourdieu's knowledge as symbolic imposition of the certain vision of world, Foucault's knowledge as power to define others and to produce discourses and truth, and Baudrillard's knowledge as reproduction of images and cause of simulation.

These theorists adopt a relation approach to power and explore the links between power and strategies. Power in all these theories is considered as dispersed throughout the society (social body), but Bourdieu tries to describe the resources of power (in same time arguing that power can be possessed), Foucault focuses on the functioning of power (by considering that power is not the commodity of individuals or groups), while Baudrillard insists that power is so dispersed that is no sense to speak about it's structures and effects and manifests the death of 'true' power, because in post-modern society all that remains is the illusion of power - "the interplay of codes and simulacra replaces relations of power and domination" (Kellner 1989; 139). However, it is possible to notice another similarity: all of them are interested in 'micro-revolts' - "multiplicity of dispersed micro-power relations" (Sarup 1988; 82). But if Bourdieu maintains the individual as active agent, Foucault states that individual is not more an agent of power, rather "the individual is both an effect of power and the element of its articulation" (Smart 1985; 79). More complicated situation of relations of individual and

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power in Baudrillard's theory: because power disappears, individual can not neither possess it, nor use it, all that remains is simulation of power and nostalgia for power.

Thus, it can be concluded that in the postmodern discourse on power these theories can be ordered by starting from Bourdieu (with his closeness to traditional approach on power by emphasis on sources and domination dimension of power), further, Foucault (with his deconstruction of mechanics of power and focusing on locality), and finally, Baudrillard (with his irony, gaming and profit of simulation of world). However, such schema is too simplified that it is better, as Kellner proposes, to adopt Ernst Bloch's notion of *nonsynchonicity*. Therefore Kellner argues that "we are currently in a transitional *nonsynchonic* social situation in which we live in many worlds at once, and thus need a multiplicity of viewpoints to make sense out of various domains of our social experience" (Kellner 1989; 142). Thus, at times we still face the accumulation of power resources and struggle for domination; "at other times we are confronted with the more subtle forms of disciplinary or normalising power or the panoptic powers of surveillance which Foucault describes so well; and sometimes we find ourselves in the new situations which Baudrillard evokes, as when we are confronted with political or religious simulacra or with media signs which attempt to seduce us into purchases, normalised behaviour, voting or whatever" (ibid.; 142).

Footnotes

[1] For Baudrillard, 'simulacra' are reproductions of objects or events, while the 'orders of simulacra' form various stages or 'orders of appearance' in the relationships between simulacra and 'the real' (Kellner 1989; 78).

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