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## Change of Values in Lithuania in the Process of European Integration (Vertybių kaita Baltijos šalyse europinės integracijos kontekste)

### Santrauka

*Vertybių kaitos problema nėra pakankamai ištirta, ypač Baltijos šalyse ir apskritai pokomunistinėse šalyse. Ši problema tampa dar aktualesnė eurointegracinių procesų bei jų įtakos visuomenės vertybinėms orientacijoms kontekste. Todėl šio straipsnio tikslas – išanalizuoti vertybines orientacijas bei jų kaitą trijose Baltijos šalyse (Lietuvoje, Latvijoje, Estijoje) įvertinant tai nulėmusius politinius, ekonominius, socialinius, kultūrinius aspektus.*

*Tiriant vertybių kaitą remtasi Schwartzo ir Bilsky (1987, 1990) metodologija, Ingleharto (1990, 1995, 1997, 2000), De Graaf ir Evans (1996) teorinėmis nuostatomis. Empirinė tyrimo dalis analizuoja apklausos “Baltic Barometer – 2001” duomenis. Ši apklausa – tarptautinio projekto “Demokratizacija ir socialinė kaita Baltijos šalių regione”, koordinuojamo Södertörns universiteto Švedijoje, dalis.*

*Tyrimo rezultatai atskleidė, kad pagrindinės kultūrinės normos ir vertybinės orientacijos per pastaruosius dešimtį metų kito nežymiai. Kultūrinis kaitos procesas yra ilgas ir ypač sunkus vyresnės kartos žmonėms, kurių vertybinė sistema formavosi esant kitai socialinei-ekonominei aplinkai. Todėl kultūriniai pokyčiai atsilieka nuo ekonominių bei politinių ir vyksta keičiantis kartoms. Kuo didesni ilgalaikiai ekonominiai pokyčiai šalyje, tuo labiau skiriasi vertybinės kartų orientacijos.*

*Vertybių transformacija, vykstanti europinės integracijos kontekste, neišvengiamai siejasi su individualizmo/kolektyvizmo bei modernizmo/tradiciškumo santykio kaita. Ekonominė bei technologinė pažanga, nepaisydama tautinių ribų, skatina visapusišką integracinį procesą, todėl iškyla tautinės ir globalinės kultūros santykio problema, kuri siejasi su tradiciškumo ir modernizmo samplaika šiuolaikinėje kultūroje. Tyrimas atskleidė, kad amžius yra labai svarbus kintamasis vertybių kaitos analizėje.*

*Lietuvoje, Latvijoje ir Estijoje galima stebėti šias vertybių kaitos tendencijas: vertybinių orientacijų skirtumai tiesiogiai priklauso nuo respondentų amžiaus ir laikotarpio, kurio metu formavosi vertybinės nuostatos. Vyresnioji karta labiau vertina tradicines vertybes, o jaunimas imlus naujovėms ir greičiau perima, internalizuoja naujas vertybes. Jaunimo pažiūros žymiai liberalesnės. Sovietinis laikotarpis paliko ženklų pėdsaką tuo laikotarpiu brendusių žmonių sąmonėje. Tolerancijos socialinėms mažumoms stoka – uždaros visuomenės palikimas. Europinė integracija ir demokratizacija keičia vertybines nuostatas. Jaunimas labiau pasitiki naujomis demokratinėmis institucijomis, yra liberalesnių pažiūrų, pasižymi didesne tolerancija socialinių mažumų atžvilgiu.*

### Introduction

A new worldview is gradually replacing the one that has dominated in the totalitarian Soviet regime over 50 years. The three Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – have

been undergoing tremendous transformations in the sphere of politics, economy and culture. The consequences of this transformation are still taking shape, and elements of the older

culture are still widespread, but the major features of the new pattern can be discerned.

Currently, under the process of democratisation, a re-orientation process is going on in all groups of society. In this process not only younger but also middle-aged and old people become adherent to new “modern” and “post-modern” values strongly supported by powerful socialisation agents like media, advertisements, life-style and consumption models streaming from the West. As a result, the system of values has been undergoing tremendous changes.

In the process of European integration and seeking for the membership inside the European Union, *the problem* of value change remains very significant if we are to understand processes of change not only in the economy, politics, and society in general, but in the minds, outlooks and social behaviour of the people as well.

*The purpose* of this paper is to identify similarities and differences in attitudes, beliefs and value priorities between the three Baltic countries – Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and to suggest historical, economic, social, cultural, etc., aspects of these countries that may account for the differences.

When analysing the changes occurring in the system of values and speaking about its further developments it is very important to analyse cross-generational differences. We may hypothetically suppose that young people have quite different perception of democracy compared to those who grew up and formed their system of values under the Soviet system, or the strata of elderly people who were raised in the surrounding of the first independent Republic. Post-Soviet youth as a social group and their beliefs, attitudes, system of values have not been sufficiently researched. The image of the new generation, post-Soviet youth, is under the continuous process of development. As the previous research in the field indicates, (Liubinienė 1998) the strata of old “pre-Soviet” intelligentsia was very important in organising the “silent” resistance against the Soviet rule and keeping the customs, traditions

alive. It was the key aspect of socialization, at least in Lithuania, leading finally to the awakening of the nation and “singing revolution”. It was due to them that “cultural reproduction” persisted through several generations. The key aspect of cultural reproduction, as pointed out by Schöpflin (2000; 15), is that it establishes the means by which communities seek to keep themselves in being. Ethnicity, according to Bourdieu (1993), is about cultural reproduction.

Another, no less important factor to be analysed is the effect of the totalitarian period, which has left a deep imprint in the minds, attitudes and beliefs of people. The previous analysis of attitudes, beliefs and values in the three Baltic countries (Liubinienė 2002) has revealed that the similarity of attitudes in all the three countries may be accounted by the shared political past. All the three countries have experienced the Soviet political rule and Soviet economic development. Thus, they are similar as ex-socialist countries.

### **Population and the sample**

The survey “Baltic Barometer – 2001” is the second data release in a series of survey research conducted at the Södertörns Högskola by the project “Democracy and Social Transition in the Baltic Sea Region”. The first survey was carried out in 1999. In 2001, a survey was repeated in the Baltic States and Poland with almost similar question modules. The survey aimed at providing an overview of the characters of social transition, values and attitudes of the respondents in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

The sample was a stratified multi-stage sample, which is representative to the totality of the inhabitants of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania at the age 18-75. At the first stage of sampling, the sampling points with the assistance of computer program following the proportionality of population and random principle were selected. At the second stage of sampling, a random route with starting addresses was applied. Starting addresses of route method

were selected from register of inhabitants applying the principle of random choice.

The population of the place of residence represented in the sample is as follows: N = 1.114 in Estonia, 1.110 in Latvia and 1.130 in Lithuania.

Following the aim to analyse differences in attitudes, values and beliefs by age, three age groups have been discerned. The youngest group has been comprised of the respondents, aged 18-29. This social group has been raised and has been forming its identity and the system of values under the influence of the new democratic developments in the three Baltic countries. In the Lithuanian case this group makes about 23%, in Latvian – 22%, in Estonian – 24% of the whole sample. The second group, aged 30-49, represents those people who were raised and educated under the Soviet system, but were young enough to adjust to political, economic and social reforms, if they had been initiative and active enough or willing to change something in their lives. This group comprises 38-40% of the whole sample. And, finally, the third group, aged 50-75, constitutes 36-39% of the sample. It represents the views of the older generation. The value system of this group has been formed under the different systems and they have found the changes to be the most difficult.

The data have been analysed using SPSS.

### **Theoretical background**

To analyse the value change in relation to the processes of democratisation in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, cross-generational differences have been taken into focus. Cultural or country differences are also very much important, and should be taken into account. But, on the other hand, all the three countries are similar in sharing the experiences of the Soviet period and this should also be considered. Cultural distinctions are based on deeply-rooted values which, in turn, according to Hofstede's theory (1980), can be delineated along five fundamental dimensions: power distance; individualism versus collectivism; femininity versus

masculinity; uncertainty avoidance; long-term orientation.

To analyze the effect of age variable for the value change, some key assumptions of Inglehart's theory (1990, 1997b, 2000) have been used. To analyze the period effect, theoretical elaborations of De Graaf and Evans (1996) have been followed. For country differences the theoretical model of Inglehart (1995, 1997a) has been tested.

### **Intergenerational change**

Inglehart bases the theory of intergenerational value change on two key hypotheses. First, the scarcity hypothesis: "An individual's priorities reflect the socio-economic environment: one places the greatest subjective value on those things that are in relatively short supply". Second, the socialization hypothesis: "The relationship between socio-economic environment and value priorities is not one of immediate adjustment: a substantial time lag is involved because, to a large extent, one's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during one's pre-adult years" (Inglehart 1990; 68). The combination of these two basic hypotheses and the assumption of increasing material prosperity, in Inglehart's point of view, are the core of value change. The thesis refers to both individual (needs and values) and societal (economic development) factors. Early socialization, according to Inglehart (1997; 34), seems to carry greater weight than later socialization. This, of course, does not imply that no change occurs during adult years. Nevertheless, human development seems to be far more rapid during the pre-adult years than afterward, this leading to the conclusion that basic personality change declines sharply after one reaches adulthood. Fundamental value change takes place gradually; largely it occurs as a younger generation replaces an older one in the adult population of a society.

Thus, the cohort or generational effect is associated with the year of birth and concerns all events that one generation has experienced and that other generations have not.

Cultural theory implies that a culture cannot be changed overnight. Furthermore, when basic cultural change does occur, it will take place more rapidly among younger groups, where it does not need to overcome the resistance of inconsistent early learning, than among older ones, resulting in intergenerational differences. An awareness of the fact that deep-rooted values are not easily changed is essential to any realistic and effective program for social change (Inglehart 1997; 19).

### **Modern and postmodern values**

Modernization theorists from Karl Marx to Max Weber and Daniel Bell, have argued that economic development is changing the world in ways that erode traditional values, bringing the decline of religion, parochialism and cultural differences. Another major body of literature presents a seemingly incompatible view. Huntington (1993, 1996) argues that the world is divided into eight or nine major civilizations based on cultural differences that have persisted for centuries – and that the conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations. Similarly, Putnam (1993) and Fukuyama (1995) argue that cultural traditions are remarkably enduring and shape the political and economic behavior of their societies today. Evidence from the World Values Survey, Inglehart (2000; 23), indicates that both claims are true. Economic development is linked with a syndrome of predictable changes away from absolute social norms, toward increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting and postmodern values. But culture is path dependent. The fact that a society was historically Protestant or Orthodox or Islamic or Confucian gives rise to cultural zones with distinctive value systems that persist when we control for the effects of economic development. These cultural differences are closely linked with a number of important social phenomena, from fertility rates to legislation concerning sexual minorities.

Analysing the distinction between materialism and postmaterialism, Inglehart's theory

predicts that a new worldview reflects a shift in what people want out of life. It is transforming basic norms governing politics, work, religion, family and sexual behavior. Thus, the process of economic development leads to two successive trajectories, modernization and postmodernization. Both of them are strongly linked with economic development, but postmodernization represents a later stage of development that is linked with very different beliefs from those that characterize modernization. These belief systems are not mere consequences of economic or social changes, but shape socioeconomic conditions and are shaped by them, in reciprocal fashion (Inglehart 1997; 8). Postmodernism is the rise of new values and lifestyles, with greater tolerance for ethnic, cultural, and sexual diversity and individual choice concerning the kind of life one wants to lead (Inglehart 1997:23). The best documented example of the rise of new values is the intergenerational shift from materialist to postmaterialist value priorities that seems to be taking place throughout advanced industrial society; but the rise of new values and lifestyles is taking place across many other aspects of life, from sexual orientation to religion (Inglehart, 1997:25).

In postmodern society the emphasis on economic achievement as the top priority is giving way to an increasing emphasis on the quality of life. Individual choice of lifestyles and individual self-expression is coming into focus. Thus, the shift from materialist values, emphasizing economic and physical security, is occurring towards postmaterialist values, emphasizing individual self-expression and quality of life.

### **Period affect**

The other group of scientists (De Graaf; Evans 1996) has tried to prove that value change appears to be related to non-economic factors, such as education and severity of wartime experience. Thus, they have placed emphasis on the period effect, which concerns those events that effect all generations equally

and at the same point in time. De Graaf and Evans (1996) point out that only generation and period effects can account for the relationship between the year of birth and postmaterialism.

The indicators of postmaterial values can also be thought of as measuring a dimension of liberal values relating to commitment to democratic norms involving freedom of speech, tolerance, and concern with ideas and individual rights (Duch; Taylor 1993). Liberal values are associated with the level of education. This might lead to the supposition the more educated the respondents, the more liberal their attitudes and beliefs should be. Furthermore, the liberal values are likely to be transmitted from parents to children.

The West has had a very different experience from Central and Eastern Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe the meanings attached to life experiences are different and sometimes difficult to understand for Westerners. What they hear and see is translated into their own thought styles and own experiences. Schöpflin (2000:31) points out, that Western thought and speech styles are described by Westerners as pragmatic, professional, future-orientated and not structured by explicit value judgments, as "rational". Post-communists, on the other hand, are seen as relying heavily on history, on pathos, on a sense of resentment and injustice. This is the outcome of specific historical, cultural and sociological circumstances that have given rise to these responses. The Central and East Europeans respond in this way because for them fear for the cultural reproduction and survival of their communities is a real and authentic experience (Schöpflin 2000; 32). Westerners did not have to experience this reality.

A very important factor to discuss is the culture shock that most of the people have experienced after the fall of the Soviet – totalitarian regime. Democratisation has brought not only political and economic reforms. It has opened the borders for the numerous cultural influences, bringing many new problems into focus. Paradoxically enough, many people liv-

ing in the same country have experienced nothing more but the culture shock as the result of global influences. Many people have felt lost and isolated, unsure of how to act and sometimes frightened – a consequence of being outside the symbolic web of the previous Soviet culture that had joined individuals in social life.

Psychologically, according to Marx (2000; 7), we have to deal with three levels of culture shock. The culture shock triangle is composed of emotions, thinking and acquiring new social skills and identity. Many reasons, such as European integration, the process of globalisation, increasing mobility bring intercultural learning into focus. The culture shock triangle (Marx 2000; 7) provides concrete steps in dealing with culture shock, from balancing one's emotions to developing effective social behaviour.

### Country effect

Attitudes, orientations, emotions and expressions differ strongly among people from one nation to the other. These differences are fundamentally cultural.

Historically, the Roman Catholic Church was the prototype of a hierarchical, centrally controlled institution; Protestant churches were relatively decentralized and more open to local control. The impact of living in a society that was historically shaped by once powerful Catholic or Protestant institutions persists today, shaping everyone – Protestant, Catholic or other – who is socialized into a given nation's culture.

But religion, argues Inglehart (2000; 32), is not the only factor shaping cultural zones. A society's culture reflects its entire historical heritage. One of the most important historical events of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was the rise and fall of the communist empire that once ruled a third of the world's population. Communism has left a clear imprint on the value systems of those who lived under it. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, historically being part of the Protestant or Roman Catholic Church in Europe, fall within a communist influenced zone.

Societies with a common cultural heritage

generally do fall into common clusters. But their positions also reflect their level of economic development, their occupational structure, their religion, the experience of communist rule, their colonial heritage and other major historical influences (Inglehart 2000; 35).

### Analysis and discussion

The values have been analysed following the methodology of Schwartz and Bilsky (1987, 1990, 1992) who have developed the theory of universal values and have empirically tested it

in 40 countries. The aim was to test whether the given values support individualism or collectivity. Thus, a high score prescribed to wealth would be in favour of power; self-fulfilment and being influential would support achievement; varied life and social life – stimulation. Power, achievement and stimulation are the components of individualism. Collectivity is represented by the emphasis added on universalism (world peace, social justice), conformity (honouring of parents, self-discipline) and security (family health). The results are presented in Table 1.

Table 1.

Means of values by age in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test

Country:	Lithuania				Latvia				Estonia			
Age: Values:	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F
Family health	9.74	9.84	9.81	24.66	9.69	9.71	9.75	18.83	9.44	9.66	9.67	21.11
World peace	9.4	9.62	9.57	22.06	9.31	9.62	9.68	47.38***	9.03	9.22	9.38	34.75*
Honoring of parent	9.39	9.47	9.59	21.3	9.02	9.33	9.45	49.63***	9.1	9.22	9.56	28.94*
Social justice	9.13	9.18	8.91	36.36*	8.71	8.88	9.02	56.17***	8.49	8.72	9.03	29.57*
Social life (friends)	9.05	8.83	8.18	61.4***	8.94	8.4	7.99	64.85***	8.89	8.68	8.3	35.7*
Wealth (money)	8.88	8.78	8.43	34.67**	7.61	7.24	6.43	85.74***	7.41	7.37	7.18	34.05*
Self-fulfilment	8.7	8.48	6.53	147.9***	8.66	8.2	6.91	113.8***	8.84	8.49	8.02	34.65*
Self-discipline	8.63	8.89	8.39	36.72*	7.74	7.79	8.09	43.99**	7.57	7.84	8.22	41.21**
A varied life	8.53	8.02	6.98	86.87***	8.07	7.27	6.09	132.2***	8.41	7.92	7.25	83.11***
Being influential	7.12	6.72	5.92	59.2***	6.83	5.82	5.2	110.8***	6.41	5.66	5.83	32.9*
N	268	430	438		241	436	424		268	439	407	

p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Regardless of age, family health is considered to be the most important value in all the three Baltic countries. Taken together with world at peace (free of war and conflict) as well as honouring of parents and elders, it leads the top of the list. A high score provided to these values might indicate that people in the Baltic States are still in great need of security guarantees. Security, taken in a broad sense, ranges from political through economic to the security of the well-developed health care system. All these issues are very important in the new developing democracies and thus they are re-

flected in the attitudes towards values. There is no significantly important difference in the evaluation of these values in Lithuania, whereas in Estonia and particularly in Latvia the older generation tends to put even a greater emphasis on the importance of world at peace and honouring of parents. Social justice is the fourth highly ranked value in support of collectivity. The older respondents in Estonia and Latvia are much more likely to put value on social justice than the younger respondents, whereas in Lithuania the process is quite the opposite. The young are more likely than the old to be con-

cerned about social justice. The same tendency could be observed analysing the value of self-discipline. Does it mean that the young generation in Lithuania is more conformist and more likely to support collective type of values in comparison to the young of Latvia and Estonia? The answer might be positive because of specific cultural differences between the countries.

Values in favour of individualism are likely to be rated lower in all the three countries (with the exception of self-discipline, which is scored the lowest from all collectivity values). But in this part, the age effect could be analysed, as the difference in evaluation due to age is significantly important in all the three countries. The young, regardless of the country, put greater value to wealth (money), which is sup-

posed to mean power, social life (friends), varied life, self-fulfilment and being influential.

The emphasis put on power, achievement and stimulating life brings the young generation of the Baltic States closer to their counterparts in many western democracies. This might indicate that the value system of the young could be changing much more rapidly, compared to the value system of the old. Age in this case could be regarded as the indicator of change.

Similar tendencies could be observed while analysing the evaluation of another set of variables, which provides the answer to the question “what makes a good citizen?” Respondents had to answer how important for a good citizen was to consider the phenomena listed in Table 2.

Table 2.

Means of evaluation by age of “a good citizen” in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test

Country:	Lithuania				Latvia				Estonia			
Age:A good citizen is:	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F
To learn the national language	9.28	9.27	9.19	14.31	9.12	9.21	9.37	36.42**	9.03	9.0	8.99	19.52
To take personal responsibility	8.54	8.56	7.82	41.58**	8.69	9.22	8.79	47.42***	8.99	9.28	9.17	23.64
To obey laws and regulations	8.58	8.71	8.99	30.56*	8.78	8.93	9.24	47.42***	8.81	8.81	9.01	27.99
To pay taxes	8.33	8.34	8.86	28.33	8.0	8.4	9.18	93.7***	8.26	8.44	8.86	47.09**
To stay informed about what goes on	8.53	8.65	8.39	18.97	8.31	8.56	8.59	20.48	8.2	8.17	8.43	32.4*
To treat minorities as other inhabitants	8.33	8.83	8.41	30.89	7.99	8.38	8.6	41.15**	8.11	8.3	8.24	21.89
To vote in public elections	8.09	8.13	8.42	25.72	7.61	7.87	8.53	66.68***	7.45	7.31	7.54	24.99
To show solidarity with people	7.04	7.39	7.49	27.83	7.47	7.6	8.09	41.47**	7.3	7.31	7.79	38.83**
To do military service	6.67	7.62	8.18	66.58***	6.77	7.55	8.46	87.98***	7.21	7.97	8.41	67.27***
To influence political decisions	5.95	6.51	6.36	22.5	6.1	6.25	6.48	29.36	5.74	5.99	6.21	32.92*
To be ready to break a law	6.14	6.68	5.95	35.59*	5.83	5.76	5.11	40.48**	5.49	5.52	4.96	28.18
N	268	430	438		241	436	424		268	439	407	

p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

The most significant age-related differences are observed in the Latvian sample. It could be explained both by period and by genera-

tional effect. The young in Latvia are less likely than the old to emphasize the importance of learning the national language, taking personal

responsibility, obeying laws and regulations, treating minorities as other inhabitants. The older respondents are much more likely to pay taxes, to vote in public elections, to show solidarity with people who are worse off and to do military service, compared to the younger respondents. The young in Latvia and Lithuania are more likely to be ready to break the law when one's conscience demands it. In the Lithuanian sample the significant difference between the responses of the different age groups is observed only in several cases. The young in Lithuania (aged 18-29), contrary to the other countries, are more apt to take personal responsibility. Higher score on responsibility taken together with higher ranking of social justice discussed previously, might lead to the supposition that some of the discrepan-

cies could be explained taking into account country differences. But similar to other countries, the young in Lithuania are less concerned about doing military service and obeying laws and regulations. In the Estonian case, the young are less likely to pay taxes, to show solidarity with people who are worse off, to do military service and to influence political decisions. We do not find any significant age-related differences in the evaluation of other phenomena.

The analysis of age-related differences points to the gap between the attitudes of those over 50, and those under 30 years of age. Here we could discuss the process of intergenerational change. The analysis of the next group of variables (Table 3) could bring to more empirical evidence.

Table 3.

**Means of justification of the following social phenomena by age in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test**

Country:	Lithuania				Latvia				Estonia			
Age:Phenomena:	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F
Euthanasia	6.53	6.8	4.73	89.27***	5.57	5.42	3.92	43.57***	6.0	5.78	4.86	54.5***
Divorce	5.78	5.78	4.21	75.68***	6.04	6.05	5.34	45.81***	6.7	6.43	5.96	30.59
Abortion	4.81	4.83	2.80	111.8***	4.82	5.11	4.3	37.97**	5.21	5.66	4.82	25.8
Avoiding fares on public transport	3.72	3.27	1.97	80.67***	5.1	3.94	2.44	161.8***	4.66	3.73	2.58	101.1***
Homosexuality	3.66	2.38	0.97	152.1***	3.05	2.18	0.91	127.6***	4.08	3.03	1.74	103.1***
Prostitution	3.38	3.23	1.44	111.5***	2.96	3.23	1.54	117.2***	3.65	3.13	1.77	89.8***
Buying stolen goods	2.14	1.33	0.83	80.96***	2.53	1.38	0.69	136.1***	2.18	1.3	0.83	81.79***
Suicide	1.97	2.04	1.43	38.74**	2.38	2.23	1.76	54.62***	2.5	2.33	1.66	49.63***
Accepting bribes	1.8	1.63	0.82	81.49***	1.58	1.1	0.69	62.39***	1.74	1.33	0.78	69.79***
Claming social benefits	1.82	1.48	1.2	43.61**	2.89	1.98	1.27	113.7***	2.56	1.61	1.19	80.51***
N	268	430	438		241	436	424		268	439	407	

p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

The most significant age-related differences could be found when analysing attitudes towards the phenomena listed in Table 3. It could be explained relying on the fact that the Baltic

States belong to the cluster of post-Soviet countries. Such social phenomena as "homosexuality" or "prostitution" were denied as not existing in the Soviet Union. Only with the advance



of democracy it became possible to discuss openly the problems related to homosexuality, prostitution, abortion, euthanasia or suicide. These were the issues raised by media first of all. Thus, the opening borders and advancement of democracy has revealed lots of problems that have never been discussed openly previously. The discussions exposed a high degree of intolerance towards the phenomena, which had been ignored for such a long time. Lack of tolerance is the main characteristic feature of the old generation. Tolerance of difference is fostered through understanding of difference. But it is much more difficult to adjust to the new set of values in older age and we may assume that it is impossible to stay objective if one has got no wish to accept the influences of other cultures the way they exist without passing a personal judgement on it.

The young could be characterised as more tolerant in their judgements, as the process of

socialisation and value formation of the young has already been taking form under developing democracy. Their attitudes may be still different from the attitudes of western youth, but they are much more tolerant, compared to their parents and grandparents.

On the other hand, the older generation having expressed their negative attitude towards buying of stolen goods, accepting bribes, claiming social benefits and avoiding fares on public transport, reveal that they put greater emphasis on honesty, fairness and plain dealing. It is a reflection of the system of values, which supposedly has been formed under the strong influence of religious mores and other traditional beliefs. It might seem strange, but those who are in a real need of social support (e.g. retired people), reprehend claiming social benefits or avoiding fares on public transport.

Table 4

**Personal trust in social institutions by age in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. Results of F test**

Country:	Lithuania				Latvia				Estonia				
	Age:	Institutions:	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75	F	18-29	30-49	50-75
Hospitals	6.49	6.23	6.94	48.48***	7.04	6.39	7.05	62.52***	6.83	6.3	7.12	54.82***	
The churches	6.28	6.81	7.65	63.72***	7.16	7.22	7.96	49.94***	6.6	6.49	7.57	60.88***	
Private enterprises	6.31	5.67	5.2	34.04*	5.81	4.96	4.68	44.36***	5.65	5.08	5.02	37.67**	
Universities	7.13	7.0	6.98	25.06	7.58	7.29	7.54	31.54*	7.9	7.74	7.98	28.77	
Central bank	6.2	5.53	4.91	43.34**	6.47	5.99	5.8	34.19*	6.74	6.4	6.38	16.45	
Press (newspapers)	6.9	7.1	7.1	24.12	6.24	6.0	6.18	27.48	5.92	5.84	6.19	24.28	
Television, Radio	6.92	7.09	7.17	35.19*	6.5	6.14	6.4	36.37*	6.41	6.15	6.59	27.83	
Trade unions	4.72	4.79	4.53	54.39***	5.07	4.86	4.75	43.27**	5.43	5.14	5.51	31.48*	
National military	5.41	5.6	5.62	38.51**	5.34	5.35	6.16	42.84**	6.23	6.45	7.05	35.51*	
President	5.25	5.5	5.22	35.09**	6.22	6.53	7.08	63.46***	6.55	6.53	6.73	36.68*	
Government	3.82	3.76	3.62	45.03***	3.87	4.11	4.09	22.69	4.27	4.25	4.15	26.32	
Parliament	3.53	3.2	3.27	49.65***	3.67	3.7	3.66	41.99**	4.08	4.02	4.07	27.99	
Political parties	3.03	2.97	2.7	30.59	3.59	3.23	2.82	42.66**	3.75	3.57	3.36	35.79*	
Election administr.	5.53	5.7	5.05	34.41*	5.17	5.59	5.94	35.9*	5.61	5.97	5.87	32.15*	
Courts	4.53	4.05	3.6	33.86*	5.62	4.96	4.67	41.54**	5.97	5.65	5.81	19.28	
Police	4.34	3.99	4.13	40.57**	5.12	4.85	5.09	35.06*	5.31	5.19	5.47	32.28*	
N	268	430	438		241	436	424		268	439	407		

p<0.05; \*\* p<0.01; \*\*\* p<0.001

Analysis of trust in social institutions has revealed similar tendencies, as discussed previously. Some of the social institutions included in the list symbolize the new democratic developments (central bank, private enterprises). Others have undergone many reforms to become democratic (press, television, universities, courts). Some have been reestablished from the past (president, the church), others have the new content but the old name left (political parties, trade unions, government).

The older respondents are likely to have more trust in hospitals, the church, national military, whereas the young generation has got bigger trust in new democratic institutions. The young have got more trust in central bank, private enterprises and courts.

There is no difference between the attitudes

of the old and the young concerning the trust in press (ranked the highest in Lithuania), and universities (ranked the highest in Estonia and Latvia). This might lead to the supposition that education and mass media are considered to be the most democratic institutions by the respondents of the Baltic States. Television, radio act as the agents of socialization even in the old age, the influence of TV is overwhelming, but still it has not been able to change the world outlooks of the elderly people (towards homosexuality) as their attitudes have been formed in their young days and are not likely to change so quickly. Education is seen as a very important factor by all the respondents, which might indicate that liberal viewpoints might take over the conservative with time and due to the intergenerational change.

## Conclusions

Political, economic and social developments in all the three Baltic States are overwhelming and leading to the establishment of real democratic states. But the attitudes, beliefs and values of people who have been living under three or two different social systems have not changed significantly over 10 years. Age is a very important variable for cultural change, i.e., change in people's attitudes, beliefs and value systems of. The age-based analysis of the attitudes towards many different social developments in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has revealed some general tendencies.

1. Significant age-related differences are evident from the generational perspective.
2. Traditional values are deeply rooted among elderly people is true.
3. The young are more open to change and their value system is a representation of more

liberal outlooks.

4. The Soviet period has left a deep imprint in the attitudes, beliefs and value systems of the people who were raised under the system. This is particularly evident in the lack of tolerance towards different marginal groups, and this is the relic of the closed society.

5. The young have got greater trust in new democratic institutions, compared to the elder. This feature and inter-generational difference in attitudes is interpreted as being closely related to the processes of European integration and EU accession that is making significant contribution for diffusion of democratic values and attitudes in the Baltics.

6. There is little empirical evidence for the manifestation of postmaterialist values, neither among the elder nor among the young.

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