Šiame straipsnyje siūloma nauja kontekstualistinė reikšmės normatyvumo samprata, grindžiama Davidsono metasemantika. Joje teigiama, kad reikšmės normatyvumas kyla ne iš visuotinių konvencijų ar preskriptyvių taisyklių, o iš lokalių, įrodymais grįstų praktikų, vadovaujantis konstitutyviu racionalumo idealu. Analizuojant, kaip pasiekiame tai, ką Davidsonas vadina „pirmąja“ reikšme (first meaning), straipsnyje atskleidžiama, kaip „geranoriškumo (charity) principu“ nustatytose ribose iškyla lokalūs konteksto standartai. Laikantis šios teorinės nuostatos, išsaugomas semantinis sistemingumas ir stabilumas, taip pat paaiškinami tokie reiškiniai kaip idiosinkratiškumas ir kalbinės klaidos, nesiremiant konvencionalizmu. Taip išvengiama dilemos tarp silpnosios reikšmės normatyvumo kaip „taisyklingumo“ sampratos ir pernelyg stiprios, „preskriptyviomis“ taisyklėmis grindžiamos jo interpretacijos. Šių pastangų rezultatas – nuosekli normatyvinė, tačiau nuosaikiai antikonvencionalistinė reikšmės teorija, kuri neatmeta kalbinių konvencijų egzistavimo, bet suteikia joms kur kas mažiau reikšmingumo.
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